KAY vs. SCATES.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Eastern -District,January Term, 1860.
KAY vs. SOATES.

1. When a cestul que trust is sul juris, and invested with the entire beneficial
interest, the use is executed, and he takes a legal estate corresponding with the
beneficial estate in quantity, irrespective of the testator's intention ; although the
trustees are directed to invest in real estate, to keep insured, and to receive the
rents and pay to cestul que trust. In England such duties would require that
the legal seisin should remain in the trustees.
2. A trust is not to be sustained because it is for the sole and separate use of a feme
sole, who was unmarried when the will took effect, and there being, at that time,
no marriage in immediate contemplation.
3. A trust is special, and will not be considered executed until the time at which
the full beneficial enjoyment of the interest devised shall vest, which may be postponed until after the cestul que trust attains majority.
4. The word "issue," in a will, is a word of limitation, which may, however, by
words of distribution among the issue, and by words of superadded limitation,
give rise to a presumption of a different intention in the testator.
5. The words "die without issue," "in default of issue," "for want of issue," "on
failure of issue," or "die without leaving issue," import an indefinite failure of
issue, from which, after a devise to one for life, an estate tail will be implied.
0. Although in Rush vs. Lewis and Kuhn vs. Aewman, the Court refused to
decree a conveyance from the nominal trustee, yet when the nominal trust
beclouds the title and embarrasses the rights of alienation, a conveyance will
be decreed in accordance with the practice of Courts of Chancery.

Upon a certificate from Mr. Justice Strong, at the Nisi Prius in
Philadelphia, the case was thus:
James Kay, on the 8th day of November, 1853, made his last
will and testament, and he having died, it was subsequently, to wit,
26th April, 1856, duly proved, when letters testamentary were
granted to the respondents. The part of the will material to this
case is in these words:
"Second. I will that all my property be converted into money as speedily as
may be convenient, and after five thousand dollars shall have been deducted therefrom, that the residue of the said money be divided into three equal shares, and
that each share thereof be invested in unincumbered, productive, well-built, and
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improving real estate (preferably stores, and to be perpetually and sufficiently
insured) in the city of Philadelphia, or incorporated districts immediately contiguous to it, in the names of the two hereinafter mentioned trustees, and one share
thereof shall be for the sole benefit and use of my son James Alfred, and one share
thereof shall be for the sole benefit and use of my daughter Hannah, and the
remaining share thereof shall be for the sole benefit and use of my daughter Mary.
And so soon as my son James Alfred shall have attained his twenty-fifth year, the
said trustees shall pay to him during his life, in quarterly instalments, the income
of the aforesaid real estate purchased for his benefit, and his receipt, and his
receipt alone, shall be the only sufficient discharge therefor: and he shall have the
right to bequeath the said real estate to any the issue of his body, who also shall
succeed to it if he die intestate; and if he die leaving no issue of his body, the said
real estate shall fall to my heirs-at-law by consanguinity. And so soon as my
daughter Hannah shall have attained her twenty-fifth year, the said trustees shall
pay to her during her life, in quarterly instalments, the income of the aforesaid
real estate purchased for her use and behiefit, which shall not be subject to the control of any husband', present or future, whom she may have or take, nor liable for
the debts, contracts, or engagements of any such husband or husbands, and her
receipt, and her receipt alone, whether she be married or single, shall be the only
sufficient discharge therefor; and she shall have the right to bequeath the said real
estate to any the issue of her body, who shall also succeed to it. if she die intestate: and if she die leaving no issue of her body, the said real estate shall fall to
my heirs-at-law by consanguinity. And so soon as my daughter Mary shall have
attained her twenty-fifth year, the said trustees shall pay to her, during her life, in
quarterly instalments, the income of the aforesaid real estate purchased for her use
and benefit, which shall not be subject to the control of any husband, present or
future, whom she may have or take, nor liable for the debts, contracts, or engagements of any such husband or husbands, and her receipt, and her receipt alone,
w hether she be married or single, shall be the only sufficient discharge therefor;
and she shall have the right to bequeath the said real estate to any the issue of her
body, who also shall succeed to it, if she die intestate: and if she die leaving no
issue of her body, the said real estate shall fall to my heirs-at-law by consanguinity. Provided, that any share of the aforesaid real estate, the benefit and use of
which may fall, by survivorship, to any one or more of my children, shall continue
to be held by the trustees, to pay during life, the income thereof, in quarterly
instalments, to the child or children entitled thereto, and that the said real estate
thus received by survivorship, shall be subject to the same provisions and conditions
hereinbefore made in the case, and as if it had been a part of the original share
hereinbefore by me directly bequeathed for the benefit and use of the said surviving
child or children; and provided, that until my children shall respectively attain
the twenty-fifth year of his or her age, the trustees shall allow to each of them,
from his or her income, such money for his or her support and education as they
may think proper and expedient, and that they shall invest the surplus in real
estate, which shall be considered and used, and be subject to the same provisions
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and conditions as if it were a part of the original patrimony bequeathed by me,
directly to be invested inreal estate, for the benefit and use of each of my children,
namely, to pay to'each of them entitled thereto, the income during life, of such
surplus so invested inreal estate, and so forth, as hereinbefore provided."
"1Third. And the five thousand dollars set apart, as hereinbefore provided,
with its increase, I bequeath to my son James Alfred, to be paid to him when he
shall have attained the twenty-fifth year of his age, that he may use the same as
capital inbusiness, or in such other manner as may seem good to him."

On the 31st December, 1859, J. Alfred Kay, Wm.H. Furness,
Jr., and Hannah his wife, (formerly Hannah Kay;) and Mary Kay,
brought their bill in equity against Charles W. Scates and Edwin R.
Cope, executors under the last will and testament of James Kay,
deceased, setting forth the devise to each of the testator's children,
(the complainants) the trust imposed therein, the respective ages
of J. Alfred Kay, Hannah Furness, (late Hannah Kay,) and Mary
Kay, to wit: 25, 23, and 21 years, the intermarriage of Hannah
Kay, since the testator's death, with Wim. H. Furness, Jr.; the
direction that the defendants should sell, and invest the moneys
realized from such sales in real estate, to be held in trust for the
benefit of the complainants, as set forth in the will; the action of
the defendants in pursuance of such direction, and the prayer of
the complainants that the Court 'would compel the defendants to
convey the legal title to the real estate aforesaid to the complainants, in equal portions.
The defendants, in their answer, admitted the facts set forth in
the said bill, and stated that they had not completely settled the
estate, that one account had been filed, been before an auditor, and
duly confirmed. The manner and amount of their investments
were shown. The respondents further stated that they were
advised that the complainants had but a life estate in the said real
estate, with a power of appointment; and that the trust should be
enforced, the intention of the testator sustained, and prayed that
the complainants' bill be dismissed.
The case was submitted upon bill and answer, at Nisi Prius,
before Mr. Justice Strong, 'who made the following decree:
"And now, to wit, January 10th, 1860, it is ordered that the
prayer of the complainants be denied, and that their bill be dismissed."
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Whereupon the complainants asked for an order to certify the
proceedings to the Court in bane, and assigned for error the decree
of the learned Judge.
Hopper, for complainants.
The trust contained in the will is not a special trust, which the
statute of uses does not affect, but a trust general, upon which the
I
statute executes the possession.
Where the entire beneficial interest is given to the cestui que
trust, in Pennsylvania the trust will not be considered a trust special, unless there is some legal disability in the cestui que trust.
The trust must support a lawful interest beyond that held
and enjoyed by the cestui que trust, and as a consequence, the
trustee must have such a duty to perform as can only be done by
the legal seisin remaining in him.
The entire beneficial interest having been given to J. Alfred
Kay, the trust in his favor, after his attaining the age of twentyfive years, becomes a legal interest, there being no disability
requiring protection. Smith vs. Starr, 3 Whar. 62; Hammersly
vs. Smith, 4 Whar. 126; Nash vs. Nash, 3 Barn. & Adol. 839;
KYuhn vs. Newman, 2 Casey, 227; Bush's Appeal, 9 Casey, 85.
The attempted limitation for life is an estate of the same nature as
that limited over; they are both legal, and will unite by the rule
in Shelley's Case, 2 Jarman, 244; Prattvs. -MelCawley, 8 Harris,
264; Rileman vs. Bonslaugh, 1 Harris, 3-14. The limitation over
is to issue of the body, which, in their first and ordinary meaning,
are words of limitation. 2 Jarmat, 235; ilfiddleworth vs. Collins,
1 Phil. Rep. 139; Haines vs. Tfitmer, 2 Yates, 400; Jiichelberger
vs. Barnitz, 9 W. 450; Clark vs. Baker, 3 S. & R. 477. The
case in 1 Co. 66, Archer's Case, is not applicable; there the issue
were, by other words, made the root of a new inheritance. The
power of appointment will not defeat the application of the rule in
Shelley's Case, 2 Crabbe on Real Estate, 34; King vs. ltfelling, 1
Yen. 214; Carter vs. McMichael, 10 S. & R. 429.
The cases of Reese vs. Steel, 2 Sim. 233; Bobinson vs. Robinson, 1 Burr, 38; and Paxon vs. Lefferts, 3 Rawle, 59; contain
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the principle applicable to the case here, and decide that the estate
of the devisees is an estate in fee simple. Clark vs. Barker, 3 S.
& R.,470, is to the same effect.
The estate tail is, by the act of 1855, enlarged to an estate in
fee simple.
If the devises were taken to be estates for the life of the children
only, with remainder to the issue as purchasers, which, in the
present case, would be contingent remainders, the children having
also the fee simple title by descent, they could by deed make conveyances in fee simple, in which case the two estates would not open
to let in the contingent remainders. Stewart vs. -enower, 7 W. &
S. 288; Bennett vs. Morris, 5 Rawle, 9; 2 Jarman, 245, 246;
Nash vs. Nash, before cited. The reasoning is alike applicable to
each of the shares.
Naglee's Appeal, 9 Casey, 89, is an authority that a deed from
the trustees would be proper.
-pancoast,for respondents.
It is clearly the intention of the testator that complainant should
only take a life estate. The words superadded are words of purchase, and not words of limitation; and by the words of the will,
"any the issue of his body," an indefinite succession of lineal
descendants is not meant. The word "issue" is ambiguous in a
will, and does not imply in itself the idea of inheriting. -Earl of
Oxford vs. 0hurchill, 3 Yes. & Bea. 67. There is a less degree
of presumption against construing the word "issue," than the
words "heirs of the body," to be words of purchase. Smith on
Ex. Interests, § 525.
The words "any the issue of his body," are first used by the
testator to describe those among whom the donee has the power to
appoint. They must be held here to describe a class among whom
the appointment is to be made, and must be living in the lifetime
of the donee. Sug. on Powers, 475; Hfockey vs. Hfawley, 1 Ves.
Jr. 143, and note 4 to p. 152 ; Paul vs. Compton, 8 Yes. 380.
The same words are used to describe those to take in default of
appointment, and they must be taken to have the same meaning,
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there being nothing in the will from which a different meaning
can be inferred. 2 Jar. on Wills, 527.
Besides, this is the most simple and natural meaning. S. & R.
155. If the devise was on an indefinite failure of issue, it must
equally limit the estate to be taken under it, as in default of appointment it involves the improbable construction that the testator
intended the real estate to be appointed to any of the issue, their
heirs and assigns, with the condition that they should hold so long
as any of the issue of the donee should be in existence. If he did
not intend this, then he did not mean an indefinite failure of issue,
and the proper construction is that complainants take life estates,
with powers of appbintment to any of their issue living at their
deaths, in fee, who, in default of appointment, take among them
in fee, and if there be no issue living at the death of donee, then
over. Smith 6n Ex. Dev. ss. 527, 530; ffockley vs. Kawbey, 3
B. C. R. 82, (Perkins' Ed. 73, note a;) Suddigton vs. Kime, 1
Ld. Raym. 203; Abbot et al. vs. Jenkins, 10 S. & R. 298; -Dunwoodie vs. Reid, 3 S. & R. 470; Greenwood vs. Bothwells5 Mann
and Gr. 628; 5 S. & R. 99; Findley vs. Riddle, 3 Binn. 139.
II. The testator directs the defendants to convert the whole of
his estate to realty, to keep the same sufficiently insured, receive
the rents, and pay over to the complainants what they, the trustees, deem sufficient for support and education, until they are
twenty-five; all of which cannot be done unless the legal estate is
in them. There is a distinction between trusts to receive and pay
over, and trusts to permit the cestui que trust to receive-the first
are not ejecuted. ,Symons vs. Turner, Eq. Ca. Abr. 383; White
vs. Parker,1 Bing. New Cases, 573. In Rush vs. Lewis; 21 St.
Rep., the trust was to receive and pay the income to the daughters,
not subject to the debts of any husband they might thereafter
marry, and Black, C. J., held that if it had not been made the
duty of the trustees to receive and pay, they would not have had
the estate.
The direction that the receipts of the cestuis que trust alone shall
be the only sufficient discharge, shows an intention to secure for
their exclusive enjoyment the income.

KAY vs. SCATES.

The intention is a legal one; and to effectuate it, the trust will
be protected. Fisher vs. Taylor, 2 Rawle, 33; Hfoldship vs. Patterson, 7 Watts, 551; Vaux vs. Parke, 7 W. & S. 19; .Ashurst
vs. Given, 5 W. & S. 328 ; Sylvester vs. Wilson, 2 Term R. 444.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-If the estate devised for life to J. Alfred Kay, and
the other complainants, be only equitable, while the remainder given
to the issue of the bodies of each is legal, the prayer of the bill must

be denied.

There is, then, no ground for the application of the

rule in Shelley's case. The first question, therefore, presented by
the record is, whether the legal bstate is vested in the defendants

who are the trustees named in the will of the testator, or whether
it has passed to the beneficial devisees. The will directs that the
trustees shall invest the property given in real estate,,in their own
names, which has been done. It directs that the property shall be

kept perpetually and sufficiently insured, and that, on the attainment
of the age of twenty-five years by James Alfred Kay, the trustees
shall pay to him, during his life, in quarterly instalments, the income
of the said real estate purchased for his benefit; and it declares that

his receipt, and his receipt alone, shall be their only sufficient discharge therefor. James Alfred Kay, one of the complainants, has
attained the age of twenty-five. As to him, the discretion given to

the defendants to allow to each of the complainants, from his or her
income, such money for his or her support and education as they
may think proper and expedient, and the direction to invest the
surplus for his benefit, have expired. The duty of the trustees now,
therefore, is to pay over, quarterly, the whole income, taking his
receipt. Have -they, then, any duty imposed upon them which
requires that they should continue invested with the legal estate ?
If the case were to be decided according to the doctrine of the
English courts, it cannot be doubted that they have. There the rule
appears to be well established, that when there is a gift of real
estate to trustees, with a direction to convey, or to pay the rents
and profits to certain persons, or to receive the rents and apply

them for the maintenance of an individual during his life, or to pay
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an annuity out of the rents during his life, the seisin or possession
of the legal estate is requisite for the due performance of the duty
imposed upon the trustees, and consequently, that the persons
to whom the use is subsequently given take only an equitable
estate. Such interests are not held as mere dry trusts, to be
disregarded, and considered executed in the person to whom the
beneficial interest is given. To sustain a dry trust, there must
have been some special lawful trust expressed, but not so where the
trustee has active duties to perform. From the case of Lord Say
and Seal vs. Jones, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 888, to the present time, it has
been held that there is a distinction between a devise to trustees to
pay the rents, issues, and profits, and a devise to them to permit
the beneficial donee to receive such rents, or generally in trust for
the beneficial donee. Hill, in his Treatise on Trustees, has collected
many cases in which the doctrine has been asserted, (page 232.)
Jarman, also, has collected a large number, from which he deduces
the rule, that where property is devised to A and his heirs, the
question whether A does or does not take the legal estate, depends
chiefly on the fact whether the testator has imposed upon him any
duty or trust, the performance of which requires that the estate
should be vested in him; and it has been held, and is still held, that
though nothing be required of the trustee but to pay over the rents,
that is sufficient. Thus in Doe, ex dem, Leicester, 2 Taunt. 109, a
distinction was drawn between a devise to a trustee to pay over the
rents, and a devise to permit the ces3tui que trust to receive them;
the legal estate in the former case being held to be in the trustee,
and in the latter in the beneficial owner. In 6 Ad. & Ellis, 206,
Doe, ex dem. G-ratrex et al. vs. Homfray, there was a devise to the
use, that certain persons named should and might take and receive
the rents, issues, and profits, and pay the same to the testator's son,
for and during his natural life; and from and after the decease of
the son, the testator devised the premises to the heirs of the body
of the son, 'ith remainders over in default of such heirs of the
body. It was held that a legal estate passed to the persons
empowered to receive and pay the rents during the life of the son.
Lord Denman said the case fell within the numerous class where it
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has been held that a devise to trustees to pay over the rents vests
the estate in such trustees. That the devise is not directly to the
trustees, but to the use and intent that they may receive, &c.,
appears to us to make no difference, nor the absence of a devise to
trustees to preserve contingent remainders. He added, "It was
observed that the will required nothing to be done by the trustees,
and it is true nothing is to be done but paying; but this has been
held to be sufficient, and must be taken to be the present law."
And even where a trust to permit and suffer the testator's wife to
receive the rents during her widowhood, was followed by a direction
that her receipts, with the approbation of any one of the trustees,
should be good and valid, it was held that the legal estate was vested
in the trustees, and this because the testator contemplated that they
should approve the receipts given by the cestui que trust.
Neither in England nor in this State will a mere dry trust be
sustained, when the person equitably entitled to any property takes
absolutely the entire beneficial interest; and the trustee has no duty
to perform, unless it be a special trust, intended to accomplish some
object, such as to preserve contingent remainders, or to protect
property for the sole and separate use of a married woman, or from
the creditors of the cestui que trust. But some recent Pennsylvania
cases have held.that our law strikes down trusts which are valid in
England, treats them as executed, and regards the logal estate as
vested in the cestui que trust. Of this class, Kuhn vs. Newman, 2
Casey, 227, is the leading one, and perhaps the first. Bush vs.
Lewis, 9 Harris, 72, and Steacy vs. Bice, 8 Casey, 75, are in perfect harmony with the decisions in the mother country. In the first
of these there was a devise to executors in trust to pay the rents,
issues, and profits, to the testator's daughter, during her life, for
her sole and separate use; and after her death, for the use of such
persons as she might appoint by will, and in default of appointment,
to and for the use of her children. After the death of the daughter,
the legal estate was held to be vested in her appointee. Here, after
the termination of the special trust to pay the rents to the sole and
separate use of the married daughter, there were no duties for the
trustees to perform, and the purposes of the trust were satisfied.
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Then the law struck it down. Indeed, it was intimated that the
direction to pay the rents, issues, and profits, to the tenant for life,
alone sustained the legal title in the trustees till her death, though
the intimation overlooked the fact, that there was a special purpose
in the creation of the trust, to wit: the preservation of the income
for the separate use of a married woman. Steac3 vs. Bice was very
similar. There, also, the legal estate was not declared Tested in
the cestui que trust, until the special trust had terminated, and the
trustees had ceased to have any active duties to perform. But
Kuhn vs. Newman advances on the doctrine of these cases. There
the trust was to hold for the separate use of a feme covert to permit
her to take, receive, enjoy, expend, and dispose of the rents, issues,
and profits, during her natural life; and after her death, in trust, to,
educate, maintain, and support her children, until their arrival
respectively to the age of twenty-one years, then in trust for the
sole and separate use of such children, subject as to the income
thereof to their own free and absolute disposal. Until the children
arrived at the age of twenty-one, the trustees were required to
educate, maintain, and support them; after that time, they had no
duties to perform; and even in England, the legal estate would then
have vested in them. But the Court held that it so vested, even
before their arrival at the age of twenty-one, notwithstanding the
duty imposed upon the trustees. They declared that "our common
law takes a higher position than 'English common law or English
equity; that in relation to titles to lands, it does so by adopting the
forms of both as legal forms, and treating all complete equitable
titles as complete legal ones, where the persons named as trustees
have no duty to perform that requires the seisin and possession to
be in them.; and then our common law enforces the trust as a legal
estate," "even those uses that were not executed by the statute, (of
uses,) for example, those that are limited against the rules of the
common law; 1 Rep. 129, (b;) a use limited upon a use, a use of
chattels real, and a trust to receive rents and pay them to another;
2 Black. Com. 335; all these are executed by our principle." The
case in effect denies the possibility of creating in this State any
other than technically special trusts. Thus it is said that "trusts
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properly so called are uses that our law does not execute as legal
estates, because of circumstances that-take them out of the ordinary
course of legal administration, and place them under a special
guardianship of the Court; but this is not generally allowed in favor
of individual persons who have full competency to act in their own
right. A fee simple in them is treated as such, whether assured in
a legal or equitable form. In other words, persons who are suijuris
men or women, must be satisfied with the ordinary remedies and
protection of the law." And, finally, itis held that a trust to educate
and maintain children until they arrive at age, does not furnish a
legitimate reason for preserving the trust from being executed in
the beneficiary. The case was decided by an unanimous Court. I
understand it as denying _the possible existence of any such trust as
the testator in this case has attempted to set up in favor of the
complainants. It declares them to be the holders of the legal estate;
Bush's Appeal, 9 Casey, 85, substantially reasserts the doctrine of
/uhn
vs. Newman. There the cestui que trust was a feme covert,
it is true, but the gift was not declared to be for her separate useThe trustee was ordered to receive the legacy, put it at interest,
and pay the interest yearly to the testator's daughter during her
natural life, and the principal, after her death, to her heirs, share
and share alike, in equal parts. The trustee's duty, it will be
observed, was to invest and pay the interest yearly during life. This
Court held that no trust existed after the death of her husband.
The actual duties imposed upon the trustee were not sufficient to
keep alive the trust, and it was therefore treated as executed in the
cestui que trust. Kuhn vs. INewman and Bush's Appeal govern
the present case. The complainants are all sui juris. The dutiei
imposed upon the respondents as trustees, are neither greater, no
more require the seisin to remain in them, than the duties of the
trustees in those cases. Nor is the nature of the duties different.
The trustees are to pay the income quarterly, and are to be discharged only by the receipts of the complainant. The entire beneficial interest is in the ceestuis que trust. It is true that two of the
complainants have not yet arrived at the age of twenty-five, and
until then the testator has postponed their full enjoyment of the
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income of the property. Until then, a discretion is given to the
trustees to determine what amount they shall receive. The full
right to a present beneficial enjoyment is not yet theirs. But when
they shall reach that age, they will stand in the same position with
their brother, the other complainant. It need not be said that a
trust is to be sustained, because the gift is for their sole and separate
use. They were unmarried when the will took effect, and no marriage was immediately contemplated; Smith vs. Starr, 3 Whar. 67.
But the right of the respondents to control the amount which they
may enjoy until they reach the age of twenty-five, will postpone the
execution of the trust until that time. The trust could not be discharged under the direction of the Orphans' Court, after they arrive
at majority, and therefore there is a reason for its continuance, that
did not exist in Kuhn vs. Newman. But J. Alfred Kay has attained
to the age of twenty-five, when, by the directions of the will, the
whole of the income of the property devised is to be paid to him.
Under the rule asserted in Kuhn vs. Newman and Bush's Appeal,
his has, therefore, become a legal estate, as is the remainder limited
after his decease. Considering them, both the particular estate for
life, and the remainder as legal, the limitations of the will are to J.
Alfred Kay for life, with a power of appointment among any of the
issue of his body, and in default of appointment, to such issue; and
if he die, leaving no issue of his body, then over. That this created
an estate tail in the first taker, admits of no doubt. The word issue,
in a will, is primarily a word of limitation. When used by a testator,
the legal presumption is, that he intended a limitation, not that the
remainder-men should take as purchasers. Nor is there anything
in this will that indicates an intention of the testator that the word
issue should have any other than its primary signification. There
are not even words of distribution among the issue. Nor are there
any words of superadded limitation. And there is a gift over, if the
tenant for life die, leaving no issue of his body. That this means
an indefinite failure of issue, need not be argued. The subject of
the gift is money laid out in land. It is, therefore, real estate, and
,n such cases, "die without issue," or "in default of issue," or "for
want of issue," or "on failure of issue," or "die without leaving
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issue," import the same thing, to wit: an indefinite failure of issue.
An estate tail would, therefore, be implied from the devise over,
even if there were no gift of a remainder directly to the issue as a
class. And as estates tail are, by our Act of 1855, converted into
%statesin fee simple, it follows that J. Alfred Kay is the legal owner
in fee simple of one-third of the property, and that the other complainants will be similar owners, when they shall respectively attain
the age of twenty-five years.
No decree is at the present asked in favor of any other complainant than J. Alfred Kay, and we shall, therefore, only decree a conveyance to him: In Bush vs. Lewis, 9 Harris, 72, and in _Kuhn
vs. Newman, this Court refused to decree a conveyance from the
nominal trustee, in cases where the legal estate was held to be
executed in the cestui que trust by force of law, on the ground that
there was no necessity for it. Yet the nominal trust beclouds the
title, and embarrasses the rights of alienation, which belong to the
true owner. We think it, therefore, better to decree a conveyance,
and such is the practice of Courts of Chancery, where the purposes
of a trust once existing, have been accomplished.
Decree reversed.

[The Court then decreed, that the defendants should by deed, duly executed and
delivered, convey to J. Alfred Kay, in fee simple, one undivided one-third part of the
real estate, and that the defendants transfer and pay to the said J.Alfred Kay onethird of the personal property in their hands, as executors or trustees, remaining
after payment of debts, charges, and expenses of settling the estate; and it was
further decreed, that the costs, charges, and expenses, of making and executing the
said deed, be paid by the said J.Alfred Kay.
And it was further ordered, that Hannah K. Furness and Mary Kay have liberty
to apply to the Court for further relief and order in their behalf, severally, when
each shall-arrive at the age of twenty-five years.]

PENNSYLVANIA vs. TRENTON BRIDGE CO.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin Oounty.
COMMONWEALTH

OF PENNSYLVANIA

vs. THE

PRESIDENT, MANAGERS,

AND COM1PANY FOR ERECTING A BRIDGE OVER THE RIVER DELAWARE
AT OR NEAR TRENTON.
By virtue of the joint legislation of the States of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, a
bridge was erected by an incorporated company across the Delaware river at
The corporate
Trenton, where the river is navigable and the tide rises.
meetings of the said Bridge Company, its principal office, and the great majority of its stockholders and directors had always been and still continue to be
within the exclusive jurisdiction of New Jersey. Under the Tax Acts of Pennsylvania, imposing taxes on the capital of "1an institution or company incorporated under any law of the Commonwealth," it was held: first, that the said
bridge was an institution or company incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania; second, that inasmuch as only one-half the company's property was within
the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania, that one half of its capital stock alone could be
there taxed.

This was an appeal from the decision of the Accounting Departnent made against the defendants for the sum of $4,007 79, the
amount of tax assessed upon their capital stock, under the acts of
June 11th, 1840, and April 29th, 1844, from the year 1841 to, and
including, the year 1858.
The appeal was tried before Mr. Justice Pearson and a jury, at
the September Term, 1860. It was argued by Mr. Attorney-General Knox and George W. Knox, -Esq., of Harrisburg, on behalf of
the Commonwealth, and by Messrs. Fish and Mallery, of Philadelphia, on behalf of the Bridge Company.
The counsel for the Commonwealth cited act of June 11th, 1840
Pamp. L., p. 612; act of April 29th, 1844; Pamp. L., p. 498.
The counsel for the Bridge Company argued the following points:
I. The Bridge Company being a corporation deriving its powers
from joint grants by two sovereigns cannot be taxed for its entire
stock or property by the unaided legislation of either.
Middle Bridge Oorporationvs. Marks, 26 Maine, 826; South
Ca)-olina B. R. Co. vs. Jones, 4 Richardson's Eq. Rep. 559, 468;
Commonwealth vs. Milton, 12 B. Monroe, (Ky.,) 228; The State
vs. Hull, 1 Dutcher, (N. J.,) 561.
II. This bridge is not "1an institution or company incorporated
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by or under any law of this Commonwealth," except so far as it is
"a corporation living, acting, and existing in this State."
Gommonwealth vs. The Cleveland, Painesville,and Ashtabuzla R.
B. 5 Casey, 370; New York and .Erie B. B. vs. Sabin, 2 Casey,
343; Boston Manufact. Co. vs. Newton, 22 Pick. 22; Howell vs.
The State, 3 Gill, R. 23.
III. This bridge cannot, under the agreement with New Jersey,
be taxed, except so far as it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
Pennsylvania, or within her territory.
Compact of March 16th, 1786; New Jersey Rev. Stat., 1847,
p. 43; Nixon's Dig. p. 824; 2 Dallas' Laws, 143.
The opinion and charge of the Court, in which the facts fully
appear, was delivered by
PEARSON, J.-This case came into court by an appeal taken
by the defendant from the decision of the Auditor-General and State
Treasurer, who charged it with a tax on its whole capital stock from
the year 1841 to, and including, the year 1858, amounting, in the
aggregate, to $4,007 79.
The company denies its liability to pay any tax whatever, on the
ground that it is not solely a corporation of the State of Pennsylvania, its property is not situated therein, and its capital stock is
mainly held by citizens of New Jersey.
The Delaware river is the dividing line between the States of
Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The former State was founded on
a charter granted to William Penn by Charles the Second, and the
latter by a grant from the same monarch to the Duke of York.
Which proprietary first claimed jurisdiction over the river we are
unable to say, but it is more than likely it was claimed by both; as
private grants made by the proprietary of New Jersey, even on the
tide waters, were always conceded to extend to the middle of the
stream. Angell on Tide Waters, 44, 3 Kent Com. Part VI., Sec. II.,
but in Pennsylvania the reverse was the case as to private grants,
yet the State claimed jurisdiction over all the great water courses.
About the close of the American Revolution, commissioners were
appointed to settle the disputed claim for the jurisdiction over this
river by the two States, and they reported in substance that the
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river should forever remain a public highway for purposes of navigation: the State in nearest proximity to any island should own
and have jurisdiction over it, and offenders should be tried in whichever State they were first arrested, for all offences committed on
the water. The report was ratified by acts of Assembly of each
State in 1783, and the property in islands has been held, and offenders tried, under that compact ever since. Beyond these points the
question of jurisdiction was not considered important; but so far as
we can ascertain, neither State has ever attempted to assume any
authority over the waters of the stream, or to erect bridges over it,
without the consent of the other. On the 3d day of March,
1798, P. L., p. 321, an act was passed by the Legislature of New
Jersey, incorporating the Trenton Delaware Bridge Company,
and a similar law was enacted by the Legislature of Pennsylvania
on the 4th of April, in the same year. 3 Smith, 336 ; 4 Dallas,
P. L. 303. Letters patent were issued to this company by the
Governor of New Jersey on the first day of August, 1803, and
by the Governor of Pennsylvania on the 16th of the same month
and year. The minute book of the company shows that all of its
meetings have been held in the city of Trenton, its books and office
kept there, and the principal portion of the stock has always been
held in the State of New Jersey. It is conceded that the tide rises
above the location of this bridge. That this company is a corporation, under the laws of both New Jersey and Pennsylvania, is perfectly clear.
On the 11th day of June, 1840, P. L., p. 612, an act of Assembly
was passed imposing a tax of one-half mill on every dollar of the value
of the stock of all banks, institutions, and companies whatsoever, incorporated by or in pursuance of any law of this Commonwealth, and an
additional half mill on each additional one per cent. of dividend declared or made. This det was superseded by that of the 29th of April,
1844, P. L., p. 498, which changed and modified the rate of taxation
and the mode of its assessment, but retained the same on corporations
or companies. Is the capital stock of the Trenton Delaware Bridge
Company subject to the payment of a tax under those acts ? and if
so, to what extent ? It is incorporated by and in pursuance of a
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law of this Commonwealth, although its stockholders mainly reside
in another State, and, as we conceive, one-half of its property is not
within our jurisdiction. Wheii a large and navigable river is the
boundary between two independent sovereign States, or countries,
each is entitled to hold usque adfilum aquw, in the absence of any
compact or grant. In the treaty between Pennsylvania and New
Jersey, already referred to, the subject of taxation does not appear
to have entered into the consideration of the parties, as it is not
probable that either ever contemplated a bridge or dam being
extended across its waters. This not being a case provided for, we
must refer to the rights of the States independent of the treaty, and,
as we understand the law, each owns to the centre of the stream.
It must be conceded, that taxation is an incident of sovereignty, is
one of the highest exercises of the power of government, and is
co-extensive with that to which it is an incident. All subjects over
which the sovereign power of the State extends are objects of taxation; but those over which it does not extend are, upon the
soundest principles, exempt from taxation. The people of a State
give their government the power of imposing taxes on themselves,
and it is a power essential to the very existence of the government,
but they cannot confer that power in regard to persons or property
out of their jurisdiction, and if they could it might be subject to the
greatest abuse, as the only security against oppressive taxes is the
power which the constituent has over his representative. See
31' Collough vs. State of Maryland,4 Wheaton, 310. Every nation
possesses exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory, and over all persons resident within it, and its laws bind all
property, whether real or personal, therein. But no power, by its
laws, can directly affect or bind persons or property without its own
territory, for it would be wholly inconsistent with the equality of
nations, that one should be at liberty to regulate either persons or
things within the other. No sovereign has a right to give the law beyond his own dominions. Story's Conflict of Laws, Secs. 18, 19, 20.
The jurisdiction of the State extends over all the people, and over
all the property which may be considered fairly as constituting the
mass of its wealth, but not over persons or things extra territorial.
Eo well vs. The State, 8 Gill, R. 23.
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Counties and towns are limited in their power of taxation to
objects within their bounds. Therefore, it was held in New Jersey,
that a town could only tax so much of a bridge as was within its
own boundaries, and where the abutment alone stood within the
town, and the authorities imposed a tax on one-half of the whole
structure, it was held to be illegal. The State vs. Hull, 1 Dutcher,
(N. J.,) 561.
It was decided in Maine that the Legislature of the State could
not create a corporation to build a bridge and to take tolls out of
its limits; therefore, where that part of the bridge was used without
the limits of the State, it was held that the law does not imply a
contract to pay for the use. Middle Bridge Company vs. Marks,
26 Maine, Rep. 326.
As to the general inability to impose taxes beyond the limits of
the assessing power, see Commonwealth vs. Milton, 12 B. Monroe, 223; Boston Manufact. Go. vs. Newton, 22 Pick. 22; South
Carolina R. B. Co. vs. Zones, 4 Rich. Equity R. 559, 468.
Although the imposition of taxes is strictissimijuris,and never
to be extended by intendment, yet it may be limited by fair equitable considerations, so as not to embrace objects coming within the
words, yet out of the intention of the Legislature. The words of
our own act embrace all companies incorporated in pursuance of our
laws, and it must be conceded that this corporation holds its charter
under the lawi of Pennsylvania. But 'neither its property nor capital stock are exclusively within the State, and it cannot be supposed
that the Legislature, by any general expression, intended to impose
taxes on the people or property of another State, to which alone
they are amenable, and from which they receive protection. In
the Easton Bridge Company vs. The County, 9 Barr, 416, Judge
Coulter says, " This State can tax all that is within its bounds, and
which receives protectionfrom its laws, unless exempt by the laws of
the United States or of this State." There was no pretence in that
case to tax what is without the State, and beyond the protection of
our laws. In the Commonwealth vs. The Cleveland, Painesville,and
Ashtabula R. B. Company, 5 Casey, 370, there was no attempt to
impose a tax on the whole capital stock of the company, but only on so
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much as was expended in constructing the road in this State. The
Legislature exercised the same equitable power in taxing the New
York and Erie Railroad. An additional argument, as to the extent
to which the taxation was intended to be carried in property
like that now under consideration, may be drawn from the method
pointed out for the collection of taxes under the law imposing
them. In the first place, the officers of the corporation are
required to retain the taxes out of the dividends. If insufficiept, to
sell the stock of the corporators. If all other means fail the property of the corporation is to be subject to a levy and sale. Could
that part of the property situated in New Jersey be sold for the
taxes under a law of Pennsylvania? Or must the end situated in
this State be subjected to the whole tax on the capital stock held by
the citizens of New Jersey ? The counsel of the State and for the
company have both argued. that there can be no apportionment of
the tax, the one side contending that the company comes within
the letter or the statute, and must be taxed in full; the other,
that it is not solely a Pennsylvania corporation, and, therefore, cannot be taxed at all. We are of the opinion that the tax may be
properly apportioned in proportion to the amount of property belonging to the corporation within this State. A dwelling house built
half in each of two counties would not escape taxation, nor could it
be assessed at its full value in each county, else it would be taxed
double, and this company does not stand in the situation of a chartered libertine, which is to escape its share of public burdens. It
can scarcely be expected that the Legislature will provide for every
possible case by a single law, and its general expressions must be
equitably and fairly applied to the particular cases as they arise,
extended or limited by intendment, according to the special circumstances. The jury will, therefore, render a verdict for one-half the
amount of taxes assessed, according to the account as stated, after
deducting the receipt of 6800-paid to Dr. Hammond from that
half, and compute interest on the amount due after three months
from the time of stating the account.
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In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, February,1861.
VINTER ET AL. VS. DELAWARE MUTUAL SAFETY INSURANCE COMPANY.
1. A mere notice of abandonment, withoutactual abandonment, amounts to nothing.
2. If the facts do not justify an abandonment, it is not binding upon the underwriters or the assured.
3. If the ship be prevented by a peril within the policy from proceedingon her voyage, and be irreparably injured, and the voyage be thereby lost, it is a total loss
of ship, freight, and cargo, provided no other ship can be procured to carry on
the cargo.
4. The right to abandon does not always depend upon the amount of the sea damage
to a cargo, but upon the facts of the case, and they are for a jury.
5. The propriety of a sale of a cargo, at a port of distress, is dependant upon the
facts, and they are for a jury to determine.
6. If an abandonment is complete, the subsequent acts of the master cannot deprive
the assured of the benefits resulting from it.

He is thenceforth the agent of the

underwriters, and bound to use diligence, skill, and care towards the interest of
all concerned.
7. Whenever a cargo may, on account of the injuries from perils insured against,
be abandoned as for 4 total loss, memorandum articles stand upon the same footing as others.
8. The provision in a policy for ascertaining a loss by a separation of the damaged
from the undamaged articles applies only to cases of partial, not to a total loss
constructive or absolute.

In this case the Delaware Mutual Safety Insurance Company
insured for Winter, Latimer, & Co., of Baltimore, Maryland, in the
sum of $2,500, on the schooner Orb, valued at $5,500, on a voyage
from Baltimore to Portland, Oregon. And $5,000 on cargo valued
at $17,000, per same vessel, for the same voyage.
It appears that the schooner Orb sailed from Baltimore, Maryland, on the 1st May, 1851, on her destined voyage to Oregon, and
after having encountered tempestuous weather, and suffered considerable damage to her hull and spars, she put into Rio de Janeiro
on the 9th of July, 1851. The cargo was uninjured.
To make the necessary repairs to the vessel, the captain borrowed
money on bottomry of vessel and cargo from Maxwell, Wright & Co.,
of Rio. After the repairs were made, the said schooner sailed for
San Francisco, California, under the bottomry bond, on the 1st of
August, 1851, and having again encountered tempestuous weather
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and suffered much damage to said vessel off Cape Horin, put back to
Rio, where she again arrived on the 15th of October, 1851, and the
said vessel and a portion of her cargo were sold at that port.
On hearing of the first disaster, plaintiffs, by letter of September 15th, 1851, abandoned the vessel to the underwriters. And,
subsequently, by letter dated December 6th, 1851, on hearing the
second disaster, they abandoned both vessel and cargo to the underwriters.
The cargo consisted of liquors, boots and shoes, Havana cigars,
oysters, candles, starch, soap, china-ware, glass-ware, sugars, blankets, drillings, prints, osnaburgs, preserves, ginger, clocks, nails,
pepper, rice, mustard, mace, nutmegs, cloves, blacking, ale and porter, hats, figs, snaffles, cotton goods, and musical instruments.
The voyage was broken up after the second return of the vessel,
on the allegation that it would take more than she was worth to
repair the vessel, that another vessel could not be procured, and
that "the cargo was generally so damaged as to be unfit for reshipment."
There was no survey held and return made of the damage to the
particular portions of the cargo according to its several kinds, but
the whole was surveyed as a mass, and returned generally to have
been so damaged as to be unfit for reshipment.
The policy, contained the following clauses:
First. "It is also agreed, that bar, bundle, rod, hoop, and sheet
iron, wire of all kinds, tin plates, steel, madder, sumac, wickerware,
and willow, manufactured or otherwise, cheese, salt, grain of all
kinds, seeds of all kinds, fruits, whether preserved or otherwise, dry
fish; vegetables and roots, prepared or otherwise, rags, hempen
yarn, bags, cotton bagging, and other articles used for cotton bagging, pleasure carriages, household furniture, musical instruments,
looking glasses, skins, and hides, and all articles perishable in their
own nature, are warranted by the assured free from average, (except
general,) unless it happen by stranding, and amount to twenty per
cent. on the whole aggregate value of such articles."
Second. "And in case of partial loss by sea, damage to dry
goods, cutlery, or other hardware, the loss shall be ascertained by a
20

WINTER ET AL. vs. DELAWARE INSURANCE CO.

separation of the damaged from the undamaged portion of the
damaged package or packages respectively, and the sale of the
damaged portion or portions only, and not otherwise; and the same
practice shall obtain as to all other merchandise, so far as practicable."
There was uncontradicted evidence that storage could have been
had for the cargo at Rio, and that advices in a reasonable time
could have been received by the shippers and insurers in the United
States. And most of the cargo was of such a character that it could
have been reshipped thither.
Part of their cargo, to wit, the boots and shoes, were actually sent
back to Baltimore in June, 1852, and a part of it was never
accounted for.
The sale of the cargo at Rio was at a great sacrifice, having been
valued in the policy at $17,000, and produced only $5,066 36.
The jury gave a verdict, in accordance with the plaintiffs' claim,
for the full amount of the partialloss to the vessel arising from the
first disaster, and for a subsequent total loss of the same, less the
proceeds of sale.
They also gave a verdict for a total loss of the entire cargo, less
the proceeds of sale.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
THoiPso-N, J.-This was an action to recover an insurance of
the schooner Orb and cargo, on a policy for a voyage from Baltimore to Portland, Oregon, in May, 1851. In December, 1851, the
vessel put into the port of Rio in distress and was, with the cargo,
abandoned to the underwriters as for a total loss. The assignments
of error upon instructions to the jury were numerous, and have been
most elaborately and ably argued on both sides. The discussion
has served to point attention to the material questions raised, and
these alone we shall proceed to notice.
1. We think there was no error in the answer to the defendants'
first point. A mere notice of abandonment without actual abandonment, amounted to nothing. Both parties acted as if no actual
abandonment had taken place. If the facts did not justify it, the
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assured would be no more bound by it than the underwriters. And
that the latter are not, when the laws of commerce do not justify it,
is a subject of too familiar practice to need argument to prove. No
right could accrue to the insurers until actual abandonment. This,
the plaintiffs say, did not take place anterior to their notice of the
15th of September, 1851, nor in consequence of the injury sustained
upon which notice was predicated. And the defendants did not
attempt to prove that'it did-nor did they at any time do any act
or thing showing an acceptance of abandonment, even if it had been
justifiable; under the circumstances, they could not hold the other
party bound if they choose to waive it. Here, however, it was not
claimed that there was cause omitted for, and much less, actual
abandonment.
2. The second, third, and fourth errors were considered together
in the argument, and we will notice them in the same order.
It was objected, that the Court refused to charge that the fact did
not justify an abandonment of the ship and cargo on December 6th,
1851. The objection made does not appear to be on account of
the condition and circumstances of either, but because it was not
shown that the marine test of sea damage to the extent of fifty per
cent. existed. The defendants took no testimony on the point, and
were forced to rely on the chances of deficiency in the plaintiffs'
case. But in regard to this matter of fifty per cent. damage, it
seems to us they were under some misapprehension. The rule is
applicable to deterioration from what is called sea damage, that is to
say, by wetting, leakage, and the like; and is so treated and spoken
of by writers on the subject. 3 Kent, 329; Siton vs. '-Delaware
Insurance Co., 2 Wash. C. C. Rep. 175 ; 1 Arnold 199, note 1.
The same principle, in substance, prevails as to the vessel, but is
differently stated; that is to say, when the cost of repair exceeds the
one-half of its value, it may be treated as for a total loss.
In the case in hand, it appeared that the schooner Orb, having
encountered severe gales and continued rough weather in the neighborhood of Cape Horn, was so much damaged as to be obliged to
pat back in distress to some port of safety. Under these circumstances, she arrived in the port of Rio in October , 1851. After a
survey held, she was condemned as wholly unseaworthy, not worth
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repairing, and recommended to be sold. That this was a case for
abandonment for a total loss of the vessel is certain and is not disputed here.
It was also in proof, that the cargo, an assorted one, containing
fruits, fish, oysters, and many other perishable articles, was much
deteriorated, and on a survey, at the request of Maxwell, Wright & Co.,
was recommended to be sold. Furthermore, it appeared, that no
shipment either in whole or in part of the cargo, could be had from
the port of Rio to Portland, Oregon, the place of its destination.
This the plaintiffs contended was a proper case for abandonment,
not on the principle, however, of sea damage to the cargo, but upon
a principle which they claim justified it without this element. Was
it a case, therefore, for abandonment as for a total constructive loss ?
That it was, I think the authorities will abundantly show. I will
proceed to cite a few of them.
In the celebrated case of Rue vs. Salvador, 3 Bing. N. C. 266,
Lord Abinger said, "If in the progress of the voyage it (the cargo)
becomes wholly destroyed and annihilated, or if it be placed, by
reason of perils against which he insures, in such a position that it
is wholly out of the power of the insured or underwriters to procure its arrival, he is bound by the letter of his contract to pay the
sum insured."
So in Kent, vol. 3, 827, it is said that "if the ship be prevented
by a peril within the policy from proceeding on her voyage, and be
irreparably injured, and the voyage be thereby lost, it is a total
loss of ship, freight, and cargo, provided no other ship can be procured to carry on the cargo." To the same effect is 1st Arnold,
990, 2d ib. 2008, and this is believed to be the current of authorities, without exception.
Under this state of facts, the plaintiffs say, they were induced to
abandon the cargo as for a total loss. It is apparent, therefore,
that the abandonment was dependent on the facts under this view
of the law, and they were of course for the jury. The judge was
right, therefore, in refusing to charge as requested; for it would
have been error in law, as well as an invasion of the province of
the jury, so to have done.
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3. The next points relate to the acts of the master, in regard to
the sale of the cargo, but we do not exactly see how the point
arises in this case. The sale took place some considerable time subsequent to the abandonment, and as this operated as a cession or
transfer of the cargo to the underwriters, if that were valid, it is.
not easy to see how a retrocession from any act of his in making a
sale could take place. The acts of the master are usually scrutinized
with a view to the question of salvage, and if contrary to good faith
or the exercise of sound discretion, they may operate on the question of abandonment. Here, then, if the abandonment was complete, the subsequent acts of the master could not deprive the
insured of the benefits resulting from it; he was thenceforth the
agent of the underwriters, and bound to use diligence, skill, and
care towards the interests of all concerned. But in whatever aspect
we may view the point, to have instructed, as requested, would have
been error. As we have already said, the justification of abandonment did not depend on sea-damage, strictly so called, but upon
other facts and principles; the propriety of the sale, under the circumstances, was dependent on the facts, and these were for the
jury, and properly so left to them. We see no error, therefore, in
this part of tlhe case.
4. The ninth assignment of error is upon the ruling of the Court
below in regard to memorandum articles. The memorandum clause
of insurance provides an exception from liability unless the damage
amount to a certain specified sum, and stipulates that certain articles shall be free of general average, except in particular cases of
injury, such as stranding. It exists in this policy, and under the
clause the defendants claim to be exempt from liability, because
the loss was not from stranding. It is well known that the practical use of the clause is to operate on certain goods more susceptible
of sea-damage than others. Goods so susceptible are so well known,
and the ordinary injuries from sea-damage so easily estimated, that
insurers do not take the risk of all damage, and hence they usually
fix a limit below which they will not be answerable. The usage is
universal both in Europe and America, with but slight differences
in form or substance. It is apparent, from this statement in regard
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to the use and object of the memorandum clause, that its application is to partial and not total loss.
Kent states the rule to be that "if there be a total loss of the
voyage by reason of shipwreck, or any other casualty, and there be
no other means to forward the cargo, there is no distinction between
the memorandum articles and the rest of the cargo. The total loss
applies equally to the whole." 3 Kent, 267. For this many authorities are cited. So in the French code, article 409, the insurer is
exempt under the clause "free from average for all partial losses,
except in cases which authorize an abandonment; and in such
cases the insured has the option between the abandonment and the
claim for average losses."
In 2d Arnold, 1026, it is laid down, that it is not, however, to be
concluded on this account, (the operation of the clause in question,)
"that a total loss on articles free of average is a different thing
from a total loss on other perishable goods not so insured; the contrary is the case." See authorities cited in note 1, same page.
"In all cases, in fact," says the same authority, "except those
of partial loss, the goods comprised in the memorandum stand on
the same footing as other goods. If the question turn on a totality
of the loss, there is no difference between them and other perishable
articles."
"Whether the loss be total or partial in its nature, must depend
on general principles. The memorandum does not vary the rules
by which, when a loss on such articles happens it is to be deemed
partial or total. It does no more than preclude indemnity for an ascertained partial loss." Poole vs. ProtectionIns. Co., 14 Conn. 47.
In Marian vs. United States Ins. Co., 3 Wash. C. C.Rep. 256,
the doctrine is stated thus: "If the question turn on totality of loss,
unconnected with the subject of loss by deterioration of the cargo
in value, or reduction in quantity, there is no difference between
memorandum and other articles. If the loss be total in fact, or is
such as the insured is permitted to treat as such, be is entitled to
abandon and to recover as for a total loss, in the case of memorandum articles; but always with this exception, that he is not permitted to turn a partial into a total loss."
The rule, therefore, deducable from these and many other authori-
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ties is, that whenever the cargo may, on account of injuries from
perils insured against, be abandoned as for a total loss, memorandum
articles stand upon the same footing as others. There is much
diversity on the subject of deterioration of the class of articles and
the effect of a total change of their character, although they remain
nominally in species the same, as incurring liability on part of the
insurers. But, as the question does not properly arise here, we
express no opinion on the subject. We do not think the assignment
of error thus noticed is sustained, and accordingly we overrule it.
5. We do not see any practicable difficulty under the tenth error,
because the loss of both vessel and cargo may be treated as total,
if the evidence was believed, and they both belonged to the same
party. The doctrine of contribution in payment of the bottomry
*bond does not arise in that form here, in which it might, and
undoubtedly would, in cases of partial loss, or between- separate
owners.
6. Neither is the eleventh error sustained. It was truly said by
the counsel for the defendants in error, that the provision in a
policy for ascertaining a loss, by a separation of the damaged from
undamaged articles, applied only to the cases of partial, not to a
total loss, constructive or absolute; for so it expressly appears in
the conditions attached to the'policy. Discovering no error in any
part of this record, the judgment is affirmed.
0. ITgersoll, Esq., for plaintiffs.

J. Hill Martin, -Esq., and
Geo. 3El. Wharton, Esq., for defendants.

In the Supreme Court of Illinois, April Term, 1860.
HORACE NORTON ET AL. VS. JEREMY HIXON.
1. When the sheriff, who attaches a vessel and allows her to go into the hands of
third parties, who use her and finally sell her, both the sheriff and such third
parties will be treated as trustees for all the parties interested in the property,
and in case the attaching creditor procures a judgment in the attachment suit, he
may compel the sheriff and the parties having the earnings and proceeds of the
vessel to account for the same and have them applied to the payment of his
judgment.
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2. A Court of Chancery has jurisdiction in such case, although the earnings and proceeds might have been reached by a garnishee, it furnishing a much safer and
more efficient remedy, and the funds being treated as trust funds.

The opinion of the Court, in which all the facts appear, was delivered by
SIDN'EY BREESE, J.-This case seems, from the allegations in the
bill, to be this : The appellee, being a creditor of the Lexington
Fire, Life, and farine Insurance Company, sued out an attachment,
which was levied by Sheriff Church, on a vessel called the Buena
Vista, as the property of the Company; that the sheriff put her
in the possession of Norton, Walters &Rogers, to be run either for his
and their joint benefit, or for their benefit alone ; that Norton & Co.,
during all the season, since the vessel came into their possession,
used and ran her for the carriage of merchandise, lumber, and other
cargoes and freights for him, and that in such business she was
worth, had earned, or ought to have earned, over and above expenses
of navigating her, $2,500 in each of the years they had possession,
that is during the years 1852-3-4-5-6, and up to the time of filing
the bill, and since doing so; that in those years she had earned
or should have earned 81,800, which ought to be applied to the payment of complainant's (appellee's) judgment; that the complainant
has no means of ascertaining these facts without a discovery from
Church, Norton & Co., and each of them; that they neglect or
refuse to account for the earnings or bring them into court, or to
produce the vessel to answer the judgment, claiming that the earnings and property are subject to the payments of the judgment and
costs; that Norton & Co. claim to have sold the vessel, but to whom
or for how much, he is ignorant. These are the principal allegations
in the charging part of the bill; and they are followed by the prayer
that the defendants may each of them answer under oath "whether
the Buena Vista, her anchors, chains, riggings, and sails were not
attached by said Church, as sheriff, upon the writ of attachment in
favor of complainant and taken into his possession ; and whether he
did not let or put the same, and when, into the hands or possession
of said Norton & Co.; whether she has not been run by them or by
their consent or direction; and whether they have not sold her, and
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to whom, and on what terms and conditions, and for how much, and
in what travel, and for what freight she has been run, and for what
amount of freight she has earned since said letting, and in the
prayer for proofs, and that your orator may have such other and
further or different relief in the premises as to equity and good conscience shall seem meet ?"
'It will be observed, no relief of any kind is prayed by the bill, to
which the prayer for other and further or different relief could
apply, and it 'was, therefore, demurrable for want of form, had the
point been made: there is no specific prayer that the proceeds of this
vessel be applied to the payment of this judgment, yet that is manifestly the scope and purpose of the bill, and we can carry out that
purpose if the prayer of the bill does not forbid; that it does not is
evident. The Court would decree according to the cash made by
the bill. We do not understand these allegations of the bill
as the appellant seems to understand them; that the appellee
claims the legal title to the vessel attached, but rather as the genera] ownership was in the defendant in attachment, he had an equitable interest, by means of his levy, to the extent of his judgment,
and the sheriff had a special property in the vessel subject to the
rights of all contending parties, and if the vessel was not produced
to satisfy his judgment, but was let out and hired to others by the
Sheriff, he was entitled to an amount for her net earnings and to
have his judgment paid out of them, or if sold out of the proceeds
of said sale. This seems to us to present a plain case for the interposition of a court of equity, one of whose familiar subjects of
jurisdiction and cognizance is the execution of trusts, and although
a court of law might, in a circuitous and expensive mode, afford a
remedy by garnishment, yet it would not be so searching and effectual as a chancery bill either in form or substance, and, therefore,
the objection that no mutuality of dealings is shown can have no
influence. It is a bill to get at the proceeds of property on which
the appellee had an effectual lien while in the hands of the Sheriff,
and which he, by his own wrongful act, put in the possession of the
co-defendants, who made large profits by the use of it, and then
sold it for a large sum of money. See 2 Story's Equity Juris. 695.
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The principle is thus stated on which this bill can be maintained.
*When a trustee or other person, standing in a fiduciaryrelation, makes
a profit out of any transaction within the scope of his agency or
authority, that profit belongs to his cestui que trust, for it is a constructive fraud upon the latter to employ that property contrary to
the trust, and to retain the profit of such misapplication by operation of equity; the profit is immediately converted into a constructive
trust in favor of the one entitled to the benefit, nor is the doctrine
confined to trustees, strictly so called; it extends to all other persons standing in fiduciary relations to the party, whatever the relation may be.
But upon the ground of fraud, as well as trust, the jurisdiction of
chancery in the case cannot be questioned in regard to fraud actu'al
or constructive. Courts of equity have adopted broad and comprehensive principles in exercising their remedial justice in favor of innocent persons who are sufferers by it, without any fault on their part.
For this purpose they will convert the offending party into a trustee,
and making the property itself subservient to the proper purposes of
recompense by way of equitable trust or lien, and a fraudulent purchaser will be held a mere trustee for the honest but deluded and
cheated vendee. 2 Story's Eq. Jur. 698. We do not well see how the
parties could be reached, except by a proceedingin chancery, when this
vessel, its earnings, and avails can be subjected to the appellec's equity.
The appellee has a legal title to the vessel, nor is there any priority
of contract or of estate between him and the appellant which he can
assert in a court of law, and his remedy must of necessity be in
equity. These views sustain the ruling of the Court in allowing the
exceptions to the appellant's answer; on their being allowed and
the answer adjudged insufficient, the appellants were allowed
time within which to file a further answer, which they did not choose
to do, and on their failure, the bill was taken for confessed, and the
matters referred to the masters, who, on proof being heard, reported
to the court, on which the decree was entered. This was all regular
and in strict conformity with the statute. The amount found is sustained by the proof. The refusal of the Court to set aside the default
was a matter of discretion in the Superior Court; but if it was not,

